Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

## Recent comments

Ohad Klein: In 26, in the "Affine subspace partition" definition, "may b...Ohad Klein: In the very end of prop 12, I think there should be an index...Ohad Klein: In 25 (also in the book) "one one child".Noam Lifshitz: In corollary 17, should it be $\widehat{\mathrm{Maj}_n}(S) =...Ohad Klein: In 49 (56 in the book), it looks like a typo: $E[f_i(y^(j))]...Ryan O'Donnell: Hope so; I'm quite happy with it so far. (Thanks to all who...Yi Zhang: I got it now!!