Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

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Ohad Klein: 41a (45a in book): "let T be ...; prove something about f" ...Ryan O'Donnell: Good catch, thank you Xi.Ryan O'Donnell: Thank you! Sorry for the delay in replying.Ryan O'Donnell: Hi Ming. Here S stands for a fixed (non-random) subset of [...Xi Wu: typo: "our definition of $\mathbf{Inf}_i[f]$ from Chapter 2....Chengyu: Ex 2.c It should be "Suppose ... is an LTF with $\textbf{E}...Ming: I confuse the notation S in Fact 1.7. I wonder that the sym...