Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

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Grigory Yaroslavtsev: Nice, hope you enjoyed your visit :)Yongzhi: I think that the domain of the function g in Fact 21 should ...El Manolo: I can't figure out ex.12 b) and c) in the proposed way. Tha...R.: Is $\rho\neq 0$ required in 1(f)?R.: Typo: they introduced also introduced “tribes”Chin Ho Lee: they introduced also introduced “tribes” -> they also int...Mathias Niepert: This is not a correction but a question concerning the stabi...