Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

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Ohad Klein: Are the indexing in (the start of) 7 OK?Ohad Klein: "learning algorithm running in time in time"Amir: In the proof of Theorem 16, and in the equation immediately ...Ohad Klein: In example 6, should "of codimension less than n" be "of pos...Ohad Klein: In 15c (18c in the book), I think it should be $\cap_j{V_j}$...Ohad Klein: Bracket typo: In the proof of thm 10 (12 in the book), $sgn(...Ohad Klein: Oops, my bad.