In this section we will collect some applications of the General Hypercontractivity Theorem, including generalizations of the facts from Section 9.5.
[...]


In this section we will collect some applications of the General Hypercontractivity Theorem, including generalizations of the facts from Section 9.5. [...] [...] Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$candidate, $n$voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{1,1\}^n \to \{1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...] 

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