Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

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Matt Franklin: In the proof of Theorem 8.66 (middle of p. 225 in book), the...Matt Franklin: The "Condorcet Jury Theorem" is discussed but not named in t...Matt Franklin: In the first line of the proof of Proposition 8.45 (bottom o...Ryan O'Donnell: Great catch, thanks!Ryan O'Donnell: Thanks! The proofreader should have caught those!Ryan O'Donnell: Thanks -- I think that kind of parenthesis-free notation for...Ryan O'Donnell: Thanks! Unique Games is discussed somewhat in Chapter 7 of ...