Recalling the social choice setting of Chapter 2.5, consider a $2$-candidate, $n$-voter election using a monotone voting rule $f : \{-1,1\}^n \to \{-1,1\}$. We assume the impartial culture assumption (that the votes are independent and uniformly random), but with a twist: one of the candidates, say $b \in \{-1,1\}$, is able to secretly bribe $k$ [...]

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