When there are just $2$ candidates, the majority function possesses all of the mathematical properties that seem desirable in a voting rule (e.g., May’s Theorem and Theorem 32). Unfortunately, as soon as there are $3$ (or more) candidates the problem of social choice becomes much more difficult. For example, suppose we have candidates $a$, [...]

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jake wellens: In Ex. 31 (b), I think we should replace $1/M$ by something ...Grigory Yaroslavtsev: Nice, hope you enjoyed your visit :)Yongzhi: I think that the domain of the function g in Fact 21 should ...El Manolo: I can't figure out ex.12 b) and c) in the proposed way. Tha...R.: Is $\rho\neq 0$ required in 1(f)?R.: Typo: they introduced also introduced “tribes”Chin Ho Lee: they introduced also introduced “tribes” -> they also int...