

All Your Droid Are Belong To Us: A Survey of Current Android Attacks

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Abstract

In the past few years, mobile devices (smartphones, PDAs) have seen both their computational power and their data connectivity rise to a level nearly equivalent to that available on small desktop computers, while becoming ubiquitous. On the downside, these mobile devices are now an extremely attractive target for large-scale security attacks. Mobile device middleware is thus experiencing an increased focus on attempts to mitigate potential security compromises. In particular, Android incorporates by design many well-known security features such as privilege separation. The Android security model also creates several new security sensitive concepts such as Android’s application permission system and the unmoderated Android market. In this paper we look to Android as a specific instance of mobile computing. We first discuss the Android security model and some potential weaknesses of the model. We then provide a taxonomy of attacks to the platform demonstrated by real attacks that in the end guarantee privileged access to the device. Where possible, we also propose mitigations for the identified vulnerabilities.

1 Introduction

Today’s smartphone has as much processing power and memory as a high end laptop computer only a few years old. The additional capabilities of a smartphone also introduce a range of issues that are not present in either the security models for portable computers or traditional mobile phones. Modern smartphones are always-on devices which combine phone network connectivity with high-speed data networking capabilities and geolocation services (e.g., GPS). Further, the vast array of mobile applications that extend the feature set of a smartphone enables the user to keep considerable amounts of (private) information on the device. All of these factors pose a host of security and management problems.

The current management models employed by the major smartphone systems make them to a large extent more similar to corporate-managed devices, rather than personal machines. For instance, phones are by default not “rooted” (i.e., the user does not have administrative privileges). This management model introduces security side-effects that users are unlikely to consider. Security issues that plague typical computing (e.g., priv-

ilege abuse resulting in unauthorized network access) now also apply to mobile devices. However, common security measures deployed on personal computers (e.g., rapid patch cycles and anti-virus software) are made more difficult by the managed security model, leaving the user fundamentally unprotected.

Until recently, mobile devices used to present high operating system heterogeneity, as each device had a rather unique operating system variant. Such heterogeneity created a difficult management situation for carriers, but also made the devices more difficult to attack, as a given vulnerability and subsequent exploit would apply to a relatively small set of devices. With Android, the iPhone and Windows Mobile now making up a significant portion of the 31% of all users that own a smart phone [7, 18], the situation has markedly changed toward a more homogeneous deployment, which makes for more efficient management, while simultaneously facilitating large-scale attacks [28].

The ubiquity and increasing power of so many mobile devices poses a number of security challenges that must be addressed. In this survey paper, we focus on Android security. Specifically, we provide a taxonomy of mobile platform attack classes with specific, concrete examples as each class applies to the Android environment. Where possible we also provide attack mitigations that can be added to the current security model. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide relevant background of Android’s security model and in Section 3, we analyze new challenges that result from this model. In Section 4, we detail specific attacks applicable to different parts of Android. These attacks ultimately provide privileged access for a determined adversary. In Section 5, we provide possible mitigations for some of the attacks considered. We offer concluding remarks in Section 6.

2 Android Security Model

Android was created with certain security design principles, such as privilege separation, in mind [38]. At its core, Android is a Linux-based open-source operating system, with a layered structure of services [14] including core native libraries and application frameworks. Android natively separates applications and provides safety through operating system primitives and en-

vironmental features such as type safety [38]. At the application level, each software package is sandboxed by the kernel, making Android a widely deployed system that employs privilege separation as a matter of course. This sandboxing is intended to prevent many types of information disclosure such as one application accessing sensitive information stored on the system or in the private space of another application, performing unauthorized network communication, or accessing other hardware features such as the camera or GPS. Applications instead request access to system resources via special application level permissions, such as `READ_SMS`, which must be granted by the user.

Android's permission model requires each application to explicitly request the right to access protected resources. The permission model is intended to prevent the unwarranted intrusion by an application on the user's data and the data of other applications, as well as limit access to features that directly or indirectly cause financial harm (e.g. a mobile phone plan that charges for each SMS message). Before installing an application, the user is presented with a list of all¹ the permissions requested by that application which they must accept before installation begins. Not only is the permission set so confusing that it is difficult for users to read and understand, but it is also a binary decision where the user must accept all requested permissions or not install the application [38].

The semantics of these application level permissions may be difficult for most users to understand [21, 40], but this understanding is further complicated with implementation details and design choices. For example, a method of inter-process communication employed by Android known as *Intents* can be broadcast to several software handlers existing in multiple applications. Each application has the option of registering a handler for an Intent, and for some Intents, an associated priority. When pondering permissions at install time, a user has no way of knowing what priorities are assigned to a given handler or what effects installation will have in conjunction with already installed applications when a particular event occurs.

Applications are made available to users through an unmoderated venue, the Android Market. Any entity can create an Android Market account for a modest fee, and immediately make software available to the public. While mobile applications on Android must be signed, they are typically self-signed without employing any kind of central authority or any means for a user to validate the authenticity of a certificate. This open policy can actually make the market a means for propagating malware [34]. Attackers can easily publish malicious applications to a venue with over 4 billion down-

loads [4], needing only an appealing facade to convince users to install the malicious code.

The open nature of the Android market requires a management model that facilitates reactive malware management after applications have been installed. The malware issue is currently addressed with remote [un]install capabilities maintained by Google via the Google Talk and Google Services software present on every Android device. Following the identification of malicious applications, possibly through Android users rating an application negatively, Google may remove applications from the market and remotely kill and uninstall the applications from devices known to have downloaded the application [34]. Interestingly, while Android is largely considered to be open-source, the sources for software such as Google Talk, Google Services, the Android market app (`Vendor.apk`), and carrier-specific update software are not readily available. In this model the user only maintains control of applications found in the restricted user space, and even this can be over-ridden via remote uninstall.

3 Android Security Model Analysis

Even with the inclusion of security as part of the original design, the new security features create new opportunities for attack, and the growth of the platform provides incentive. In this section we discuss several features of the Android model that may make it vulnerable to attack.

Application model. Unprivileged application attacks can take advantage of the complexity of the Android permission model and the Android market to persuade users to install malicious software and grant applications the permissions required to deliver a harmful payload. Applications advertised in the Market must be signed by the author, but the user has no means of verifying that a signature is associated with any particular entity [27]. Even users that carefully monitor permission requests may not fully understand the semantics of a particular permission or the framework behavior surrounding a permission. Many common users may simply not understand the security trade-offs that surround permissions like `ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER` or `BIND_APPWIDGET`. Other permissions, such as `SEND_SMS` are more likely to be recognized by users, and yet the framework implementations may cause undesired behavior. For example, the receipt of an SMS on a device causes an Android *ordered-broadcast* to be sent system wide. Applications can register the ability to take action when the broadcast is observed by the application and can assign themselves a priority over the broadcast. Thus, an application that registers a higher priority will receive and have the ability to act upon this broadcast before any other

¹We show later that this list is not necessarily comprehensive




Figure 1: **Android patch cycle:** Lifecycle of an Android patch from vulnerability identification until a patch reaches the user device




Figure 2: **Android version timeline:** Google [3] and Manufacturer releases of Android 2.1 [25,29,30,43] and 2.2 [36]

application at a lower priority.² In regard to SMS, this means that any application with a priority higher than the standard SMS application will have the ability to process the incoming SMS message first, including the ability to prevent the broadcast from being observed by any other application. Malware employing covert communication channels in this manner has already been seen [31, 39]. When a user grants permissions based on prompts that show a RECEIVE_SMS permission, such behavior is likely unexpected.

Similarly, the only means a user has of understanding the capabilities of an application is through the list of permissions presented at install time. In addition to the framework implementation issue mentioned above, additional ambiguity is introduced via new permissions that existing in later versions of the SDK. For example the STORAGE permission group relates to accessing an external SD Card. The STORAGE permission was not available until API version 4, so the behavior of an older application on a newer device is ambiguous. Current devices simply do not display a comprehensive list of permissions to the user. An older application that does not request the STORAGE permission, it should not as

²Applications at the same priority receive the broadcast in an order undefined by the Android API [2]

the permission is not defined for the older API, will still implicitly have access to the SD Card [10].

In a stronger form of abuse of application permissions, the attacker may craft malicious applications to gain privileged (“root”) access to the user’s device. Typically a privilege escalation attack takes advantage of Android’s slow patch cycle, explored below. When deployed as a malicious application, the attack uses the unmoderated market’s weaknesses as a vector to propagate the malware to the user’s device.

Patch cycles. In an effort to increase adoption of the Android OS, Google created the Open Handset Alliance to build cooperation between hardware manufacturers to facilitate implementation on their devices [9]. Through this cooperation, Google provides the base open source operating system then device manufacturers and telecommunications carriers modify this base to differentiate their offerings from other Android devices and provide added value to their customers. Figure 1 shows the patch cycle from a vulnerability’s initial discovery until the patch eventually reaches the user’s Android device. Patch cycle events A through C are typical of any software product. The software fix represented by C is typically the end of the vulnerability window introduced at A. When considering one of the re-used components in Android, such as WebKit, D-G are ap-

pended to the patch cycle. The additional states added to the cycle come from Google's cooperation with multiple manufacturers and carriers. Whenever a patch to Android becomes necessary, Google provides an update through their open source forum and manufacturers then proceed to port the update to their customized version of the operating system.

Google's standard major release cycle is approximately four months, with minor patches released intermittently [3]. However, this is not the date on which these updates are actually available to users. Once Google releases its patch, the manufacturer must then update it to work with their custom hardware [23]. These updates may actually never be made available to the user if the carrier deems deployment too costly [44]. After the manufacturer modifies the patch to work with their custom device, there can be a delay before the patch is released by the carriers. An example of a delay between the manufacturers release of a patch and the patch's eventual release to the public can be seen in [33] where AT&T postponed the release of Android 2.2 to the Dell Streak creating a three month gap between states *E* and *F* in Figure 1.

Examples of the disparity between Google's release of Android updates and their eventual release to specific devices can be seen in Figure 2. It is not uncommon to observe at least two months (and sometimes much more) of delay between an Android update and an actual deployment of the update by the major manufacturers. As a case in point, 2.1 only became available on certain devices (e.g., Xperia X10) after Google had already superseded it with Android 2.2. With such a large vulnerability window and the separate release dates for Google and each manufacturer, attackers can use reverse engineering techniques to identify and exploit a vulnerability on a device using information available in the original released patch or any other manufacturer that adopts the patch earlier [22]. Platforms that exhibit slow patch cycles regularly are at even greater risk since the patches made available to comparable systems can be analyzed in order to determine the vulnerable conditions making the still un-patched devices easy targets.

Because of Android's slow patch cycles, the standard re-use of common software components that underline the Android framework can cause increased vulnerability. Within the Android framework, common open-source components such as WebKit and the Linux kernel are re-used to reduce the cost of system design. Component re-use is a common practice among large systems such as Android. Apple's iPhone similarly employs WebKit [5] and a BSD kernel derivative (Darwin) [13]. The re-use of common software components itself is not detrimental, but the additional delay introduced by Android's patching model is. Once a vulnerability in We-

WebKit or Linux is discovered, it is generally patched and released quickly by the open-source community, however the corresponding Android patch may not be available to users for months. The imbalance between the Android patch cycle and the software components it is built upon leaves a longer attack window for Android devices. Similarly, due to Android's Linux foundation, lower level attacks are simpler when compared to less ubiquitous OSes, as attackers do not need to learn a new kernel [20]. For Android to provide a secure platform it must not only strive for a secure framework, but also provide timely updates to minimize the attack window.

Trusted USB connections. With local USB access a developer can interact with an ADB (Android Developer Bridge)-enabled device. The ADB is a development tool provided by Android intended to gather debugging information from an emulator instance or USB-connected phone [1]. The ADB provides further benefit to the user by facilitating direct installation and removal of applications, bypassing the Android Market, and providing access to an unprivileged interactive remote shell. Using the ADB interface, attackers can add and execute malicious tools that exploit vulnerabilities in the device. Such malware does not need to be present in the Android market and will not be tracked for possible remote uninstall by Google. With ADB access an attacker can again take advantage of Android's slow patch cycle to gain privileged access to the device. However, this attack could be carried out via ADB without installing any application.

Recovery mode and boot process. Android devices employ a special recovery boot mode that enables device maintenance. The recovery mode allows the user to boot to a separate partition on the device circumventing the standard boot partition [41]. Android's default recovery mode image facilitates maintenance features such as applying a system update to standard system and data areas, cleansing a device of user data ostensibly for resale, or software repair to restore life to corrupted (or "bricked") devices. Because there is no trusted component to the boot system, attackers can utilize the separate recovery partition by loading in their own malicious image to gain privileged access to the user's information without affecting user data.

Uniform privilege separation. Users can download applications marketed for security, however the effectiveness of such applications is extremely limited. On a typical computer, security software, such as anti-virus, may require privileged access in order to secure permission to scan all files. Security applications on Android are limited to the same restricted environment as every other Android application. Even applications that claim to "block malware, spyware and phishing apps"

(e.g., [8]) require a rooted device in order to obtain the necessary permissions to perform these functions.

Likewise, most Android applications that claim firewall capabilities only provide call and SMS filtering. Indeed, adequate network firewall features require a rooted device [38]. Without security tools available, users cannot identify malicious content and the burden falls on the device manager.

4 Attack Classes

Perhaps unsurprisingly, full privileged device access is guaranteed given physical access. Perhaps less surprising is the relative ease with which privileged access can be obtained and the amount of nefarious activity that is possible *without* privileged access. In this section we describe unprivileged malicious applications and the circumstances and methods necessary to gain privileged access to an Android device with respect to the following attacker capabilities.

No physical access: Attack circumstances where it is impossible to gain physical access to a user's device. Then the attacker must get the user to perform actions on the attacker's behalf. Such remote attacks commonly rely heavily on social engineering [16]. To achieve the appropriate initial access to the user's device an attacker must get some malicious software running on the device. To run code remotely on a user's device, the attacker typically must convince the user to either download a malicious application or access malicious content via one of the applications already installed on the device. If the attacker can exploit a vulnerability on the user's device, then this access may be used further to gain privileged access.

Physical access with ADB enabled: If the attacker finds a device left unattended, yet obstructed via a password or screen lock, the attacker may be able to exploit the device through the Android Developer Bridge.

Physical access without ADB enabled: If the attacker finds an obstructed Android device left unattended, but is unable to use the ADB service, the attacker may still gain privileged access via recovery boot.

Physical access on unobstructed device. In some cases the attacker may actually have access to a device without a password protected screen lock. Such a situation allows the attacker to actually leverage any other attack method since the attacker can choose to install applications, visit malicious websites, enable ADB on the device, etc.

We next detail specific attacks that demonstrate the real threats present in the cases enumerated above. Note that we do not include physically destructive attacks such as opening the casing in order to access debugging ports (e.g. JTAG). The last case is included for completeness, but not specifically detailed since all of the men-

tioned attacks would also be applicable in the case of physical access to an unobstructed device.

4.1 Unprivileged Attacks

Much like a user that will install an application insecurely downloaded from the Internet despite any operating system warnings, a user may easily install applications that request dozens of Android permissions without a second thought. Applications that are restricted via Android's typical application sandbox, but that have copious access to resources through permissions, can perform many of the same functions of malware common on the personal computer platform [26]. For example the Zeus botnet architecture has been ported to most mobile platforms [15], worms such as Yxe have been seen on SymbianOS [17], and Trojan malware has been found in applications present in the legitimate Android Market [12, 27]. Users that completely disregard, or are tricked into accepting prompts from the device regarding install time permissions effectively permit negative actions completely at the application level.

In some cases, misleading the user may not even be required. Some software handlers (Android *Receivers*) may be registered by an application at install time. Intents expected to occur regularly or those that can be remotely invoked can be used to achieve remote code execution without requiring user action. Users may install applications from the Android Market web interface, which initiates a remote install. Thus, an attacker that has somehow obtained a user's authentication token to the web interface can remotely install applications to a user's device. To achieve remote code execution the attacker simply has to perform an action that results in the device generating an Intent that the app for which the application has a receiver. Even security related features, such as the screen lock may be remotely bypassed, by registering a receiver (for example `PACKAGE_ADDED`) and using the legitimate API for `KeyguardManager` to disable the screen lock upon application installation [24].

Application *re-packing* has proven to be an effective means to entice users enough to download malicious applications. Entire families of Trojan software have been classified in third party black markets as well as the official Android market. Families such as Geinimi [35] and DroidDream [32] have been found in dozens of applications in the Android market. Many of these applications offer no additional value to the consumer, they are simply existing, popular applications that have been reverse engineered enough that the attacker can augment the existing application with the malware and re-package the application. The attacker then signs the new application with a new key and makes the application available in the market for victims to download.

The fact that malware can successfully operate within Android's restricted application environment significantly lightens the attacker's burden to achieve privileged access through escalation. Applications executing in an isolated environment simply obtain the appropriate permissions from the user at install time and perform nefarious activity from within the confines of the application sandbox. Even so, attackers may wish to obtain elevated privileges in order to perform actions for which no application level permission exists, or in order to have guaranteed persistence.

4.2 Remote Exploitation

When turning to privileged access, an attacker may rely on convincing the user to install a malicious application. Such an application may present an enticing feature to the consumer but contain software that executes a privilege escalation attack. Oberheide [34] demonstrated such an attack. Oberheide's seemingly benign application received more than 200 downloads within 24 hours [34]. In the background this application would routinely make remote requests for new payloads to execute. Whenever a new privilege escalation exploit was discovered for the current running version of Linux, the application could obtain the exploit to gain root access. These exploits must be delivered to the application before the vulnerability is patched, which is generally easy to do considering the long patch cycles discussed above.

Similar privilege escalation methodologies can be found in legitimate device "rooting" applications such as Root Tools [11], Easy Root [6], and Unrevoked [45], which take advantage of vulnerabilities in the phone to gain privileged access. Users can then use this access to circumvent carrier controls over the use of a specific software or upgrade to a newer version of Android that their carrier has yet to release [41].

Deploying malicious applications with a benign facade through the Android Market takes advantage of Google's reactive philosophy toward malicious applications. Once on the Android Market, the attacker's application can now reach a global audience. Because there is no screening of applications, attackers are given a pedestal from which to entice the user.

A remote attack may not even require the installation of a new application. Android's use of commodity software components, such as the web browser and Linux base can be leveraged for an attack that requires no physical access [38]. A concrete example of such an attack was deployed by Immunity Inc. for the penetration testing tool CANVAS 6.65 [20]. In this attack the user visits a malicious website using the device's built-in browser. The attacker then uses this request to take advantage of a vulnerability in the WebKit browser [46] (CSS rule deletion vulnerability) to obtain a remote shell access to the

device with the level of privilege given to the browser. The attacker can then copy a Linux privilege escalation exploit to an executable mount point on the device, run the secondary exploit, and gain privileged access to the whole device.

4.3 Physical Access with ADB Enabled

Similar to the previous case, it is possible for an attacker to obtain privileged access through physical access to a device that has ADB enabled [19]. Given physical access, an attacker can easily determine if ADB is enabled, by connecting the device via USB and executing `adb get-serialno` on the attached computer. If the device's serial number is returned, then ADB is enabled.

Once the attacker knows that ADB is enabled on the device, a privilege escalation only requires the attacker to use ADB's `push` feature to place an exploit on the device, and use ADB's `shell` feature to execute the exploit and gain privileged access.

Different from most remote attacks, an attack on an ADB enabled device does not require any action from the user. Privilege escalation using ADB does rely heavily on the availability of an enabled debug bridge, which is only usually the case on devices used by developers and not the typical user. However, if the device is not password-protected, the attacker could simply interact with the common device interface and enable ADB.³

An example usage of this method for gaining privileged access is the Super One-Click desktop application [42]. Super One-Click requires users to first enable ADB debugging in the device. Once enabled, the application exploits the device using the previously defined method to give the user privileged access.

The main advantage of ADB-based attacks is the minimal observable footprint left on the device: no new application needs to be installed on the device and a reboot is not necessary. The lack of device modification in this method makes it much harder to trace than other attacks, and is unlikely to be detected by security applications on unrooted devices.

4.4 Physical Access without ADB Enabled

On an obstructed device that does not have ADB enabled, the attacker may still take advantage of the device's recovery mode [41]. Since the attack does not rely on a software vulnerability specific particular to a version of Android, the attack has more longevity than other exploits such as the WebKit and Linux exploits mentioned above. The deployment method is device-specific leading to extensive fragmentation based on device model and/or manufacturer.

To use the recovery mode, the attacker must first create a customized recovery image. The main modifica-

³e.g., via Settings - Applications - Development - USB Debugging.

tion necessary for this image is to the `init.rc` and `default.prop` files in the `initrd` section of the image. To give the attacker the necessary privileges, the `init.rc` file must list the executables that they wish to add with the rights necessary to be executed. Any executables necessary for the attack must also be added to the `initrd` section of the image.

Once the image is built and the attacker is able to gain physical access to the device, the attacker must then attach the device to a computer through a USB connection and run a manufacturer specific tool (e.g., fastboot for HTC, RSDLite for Motorola, Odin for Samsung) to flash the image to the recovery partition of the phone. After the device has been flashed, the attacker then can access the recovery image using a device specific key combination (e.g., Power button while holding X for Motorola Droid). When the device loads into the recovery partition the `init.rc` file is executed. `init.rc` can be modified to run any malicious code added to the recovery image by the attacker, such as auto-installing a root-kit without attacker interaction. Alternatively, the attacker could update the `default.prop` file to enable ADB, crafting `init.rc` to give executable rights to an `su` executable (added previously to the custom recovery image `initrd`). When the recovery image loads the attacker opens an interactive shell on the device using ADB. The attacker can now simply execute the `su` executable to gain root access.

Installing a malicious recovery image takes advantage of the absence of any trusted boot system on Android systems, so that it is possible to make changes to the devices boot image and gain privileged access without the need to provide any authentication to the device.

If an attacker is able to create a custom malicious recovery image, it is feasible for this attacker to gain privileged access on any device for which physical access can be obtained. Installing a new recovery image and rebooting the device is not a perfect vector as it can leave an extensive footprint sans subsequent attacker cleanup. However, the recovery image replacement has negligible effect on the user's experience. While an attacker would almost certainly have a malicious payload, this technique is similar to methods described in [41].

4.5 Physical access to unobstructed device

If the device user has elected to not employ any kind of obstruction, whether or not ADB is enabled on the device is irrelevant, as any of the techniques described above are possible if physical access to the device is available. The attacker need only turn the device on, download their malicious code, enable ADB on the device, etc. The method of attack that the attacker chooses now depends upon other metrics, such as overtness. For

example, a malicious application remains observable by the user and may potentially be uninstalled in the future.

5 Mitigations

We propose six possible mitigations to the attacks seen in the previous section. Our proposals include reducing the patch cycle for Android updates, creating a trusted class of applications with privileged access, enabling authentication on Android Market downloads and the ADB, leveraging existing host security technologies, and deploying a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on Android enabled devices.

5.1 Reduce the Patch Cycle Length

In all but one of the exploits show in Section 4, attackers exploit some flaw in the operating system to gain root privileges. Reducing the patch cycle length would mitigate these threats with greater effectiveness. Zero-day exploits would still be possible, however the common lingering threat will be reduced.

While Google has already demonstrated willingness to act quickly with out of band patch releases in reaction to certain attacks (e.g., [34]), reducing complete patch cycles is a more difficult problem. Indeed, manufacturers make changes to the Android source to create a competitive advantage. To reduce patch cycles, manufacturer modifications should not fundamentally change the core components of Android, and thus should not require a lengthy time to port the patch. A fundamental separation between the core of Android and manufacturer modifications should be established.

5.2 Privileged Applications

To mitigate application attacks that take advantage of Android's permission model many solutions have been proposed.

Barrera et al. suggest a restructuring of Android permissions into a hierarchy to allow for finer grained permissions that can be simpler for users to understand [21]. Under a hierarchy, an application displaying advertisements that would traditionally require `INTERNET` permission would need to have `INTERNET.ADVERTISING.adsite.com` permission, which would limit its connection to a specific site and let the user know exactly what the permission is used for.

In [27] Enck et al. propose lightweight application certification comparing the requested permissions of an application to a set of security rules. If the application does not pass any of the security rules, then possible malicious activity is brought to the attention of the user. Adding a certification mechanism to the Android framework would require modification of the Android security framework.

Android’s application model could also be adjusted to allow certain applications to obtain additional, privileged device access. For example, Google could validate that certain software vendors create security software and grant applications created by these vendors additional API functionality. Applications signed by such a vendor could, for example, have read access to the filesystem in order to facilitate anti-virus scanning beyond limited scope typically granted to applications. Such a configuration would allow users to install security related applications without having to first root their device. Because privileged applications will have unrestricted access to the device, these applications should be certified by some governing entity before they can be downloaded. This certification process could also help mitigate some weaknesses of an unmoderated market. With access to trusted security tools, users would be able to monitor untrusted applications and provide appropriate feedback. With a market model split into trusted and untrusted applications, Google could provide enhanced security with minimal administrative overhead and minimal reduction in the openness of the platform.

5.3 Leveraging Existing Security Technologies

There are several existing operating system security enhancements that could be ported to Android. In [37], Shabtai et al. experiment with adding SELinux to Android. An information-flow tracking system, TaintDroid, has been created by Enck et al. instrumenting Android [26] to monitor applications and understand how they interact with the user’s sensitive information. A realized implementation of TaintDroid could give users real-time information about how an application uses the permissions it is granted. Generally, operating system level software modifications such as adding a firewall or SELinux to Android involve porting existing technology to the Android kernel and creating an application to facilitate administration.

5.4 Authenticated Downloads

Once an attacker has physical access to a device, adding malicious applications becomes simple and quick by posing as the legitimate user and downloading them from the Android Market. To ensure downloads are made only by the user, the market should require authentication before every transaction, similar to the model currently used by the iPhone.

5.5 Authenticated ADB

Because of the power given through the ADB, it should not be accessible to unauthorized users. Android should require the device to be unlocked before ADB can be used. Any legitimate user should be able to unlock the




Figure 3: **Attack chart:** Android attack goals and requirements.

device and once the connection is made, the session could be maintained by preventing the screen from locking while it is connected via USB. With ADB authentication, the attacker no longer has a backdoor to bypass the lock mechanism’s authentication process, mitigating the ADB attack against obstructed devices.

5.6 Trusted Platform Module

To secure a device in a managed model scenario a root of trust must be established. Using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) provides a ground truth on which device security could be built, providing authentication of device state. Using a TPM would mitigate the recovery image attack, which relies on the ability to change the boot image. Assuming signed bytecode and authentication of the boot image, updates running unauthorized code would become extremely difficult.

6 Conclusion

Android was designed with a focus on security, however, as new security features are added, new vulnerabilities become available for exploitation. This paper builds a taxonomy of attacks on the Android OS. Figure 3 shows how an attacker could rely on this taxonomy to decide which attack path to pursue, given their own capabilities (e.g., physical access available or not, ADB available or not, etc).

We hope the present paper can further the discussion on the security properties modern mobile operating systems such as Android should possess. Mobile security is becoming a pressing challenge indeed.

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