My research primarily focuses on game theory and mathematical modeling of social behavior. I have written papers on the evolution of language, social norms, optimal social structures for science, the evolution of learning, and ethics.

All of these share a common thread of using modeling techniques from the social sciences to analyze problems of philosophical interest. I think that having philosophers use and discuss these modeling techniques will produce many interesting results both for the philosophy of science and for social science modeling.

Signaling

I (usually in cooperation with Simon Huttegger) have investigated a number of questions regarding the evolution of signaling and rudimentary languages. This research has employed game theory (including evolutionary game theory) in an attempt to better understand how simple languages might evolve or be learned by animals or humans and also to better understand how language functions in our society.

Because this research spans both philosophy and biology, I have published in both biology and philosophy journals. This research is currently supported by NSF grant number EF 1038456 (with Simon Huttegger and Carl Bergstrom).

  • To what degree is intentionality required for language?
  • Under what circumstances should one expect simple languages to evolve?
    • Must speakers desire the same thing (i.e. common interest)?
    • How much cognitive ability is required by the communicators?
  • Is the handicap principle the correct explanation for the evolution of signaling in biology?
    • Are there alternatives to the handicap principle? What are they?
    • Under what conditions will handicap signals evolve? How likely are they?

Social structure of science

My second major area of research focuses on considering the impacts that different social practices in science have on the overall success or failure of science as an endeavor. I use simple mathematical and computer models (known as agent based models) of communities of learners and analyze their behavior.

This research is currently supported by NSF grant number SES 1026586.

  • How should scientific results be disseminated?
    • Should results be disseminated quickly and widely?
    • How should journals decide what to publish?
  • Is diversity important in scientific endeavors?
  • How should scientists choose what theories to pursue?
  • What is the effect of apparently counter-productive behaviors on science as a whole?
  • To what extent does individual and social epistemology diverge?

Evolution of cooperation

I have worked on a number of problems in the evolution of social behavior, especially cooperation. I have considered both how norms of mutual benefit and fairness might have evolved in very simple circumstances.

  • What features of the social world encourage the evolution of cooperative behavior?
  • Why should framing effects have evolved?
  • How do cognitive abilities effect the evolution of cooperative behavior?

Evolution of learning

With Rory Smead, I have developed a model which analyzes under what conditions one should expect more complex cognitive abilities to evolve. This relates to a variety of issues discussed in the philosophical literature including the evolution of plasticity, the Baldwin effect, and the evolution of cognition. Our research has centered around how the presence of social situations, modeled as games, can help or hinder the evolution of learning, and how cognitively complex individuals influence the evolution of social behaviors like cooperation and language.

Ethics

With Alex John London, I have worked on several projects in ethics. We have considered the effects of bargaining on international biomedical research. Utilizing some well-known game theoretic results, we illustrated that a prominent process-oriented theory of fairness in international research would result in counter-productive outcomes. With London and Efthymios Athanasiou, I have developed a model that attempts to illustrate why one ought to value one's self worth, even from the perspective of an ethical theory that attributes no special value to self-worth.


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
 

About Kevin

Kevin is an assistant professor of philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA. His research interests include philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, game theory, and decision theory.

Contact

Kevin Zollman
Baker Hall 135
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

office phone: 412-268-8493

email: kzollman@andrew.cmu.edu