# ALEXEY KUSHNIR

Associate Professor of Economics

Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

Tepper Quad, 5228

412 268 6079, akushnir@andrew.cmu.edu

My primary research interest lies in the domain of *Microeconomics* and, specifically,
the fields of *Mechanism* and *Market Design*. In mechanism design, my work focuses on
*robust mechanisms*, that is, mechanisms that are not
sensitive to the fine details of the environment. In particular, I
analyze the conditions under which a central planner can rely on
robust mechanisms without sacrificing objectives such as efficiency
or revenue maximization (see [1], [2], [3], [4]).
In addition, my research extends to studying incentive-compatibility constraints and
revenue-maximizing mechanisms in often difficult multi-dimensional environments (see
[5], [6], [7], [8]). My work also develops an innovative *geometric approach* *to mechanism design* using
classical tools from convex analysis ([9] and [10]). In market design, my earlier work focuses on the analysis
of existing *signaling mechanisms* that have been employed for many years in job markets for new economists and new doctors
([11] and [12]). More recently, I have been interested in studying the allocation of course schedules to students in a many-to-many matching context
([13]). This work proposes a novel allocation mechanism that uses *fake money* and
*competitive equilibrium* to allocate courses to students.
I have also pursued successful research projects on subjects such as optimal income taxation
([14]), international trade ([15]),
and organizational economics ([16]).

- Gershkov, A., Goeree, J. K., Kushnir, A., Moldovanu, B., & Shi, X. (2013). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation.
**Econometrica**, 81(1), 197-220. - Kushnir, A. (2015). On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types.
**Economics Letters**, 133, 4-6. - Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2019). On the equivalence of Bayesian
and dominant strategy implementation for environments with
non-linear utilities.
**Economic Theory**, 67, 617-644. - Kushnir, A. & Liu, S. (2020). On linear transformations of
intersections.
**Set-Valued and Variational Analysis,**28, 475-489. -
Kushnir, A. & Lokutsievskiy, S. (2021). When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
**Theoretical Economics**, 16(3), 853-879. - Krishnamoorthy, V. & Kushnir, A. (2023) A simple characterization of supply correspondences.
**Mathematics of Operations Research.** - Kushnir, A. & Shourideh, A. (2023). Optimal auctions in multi-dimensional environments. Work in progress.
- Kushnir, A. & Michelson, J. (2023). Characterizing multi-dimensional auctions through simulations. Working paper.
- Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2023). A geometric approach to mechanism design.
**Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics,**1(2), 321-347. - Goeree, J. K. & Kushnir, A. (2016). Reduced form implementation with
value interdependencies.
**Games and Economic Behavior**, 99, 250-256. - Coles, P., Kushnir A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference
signaling in matching markets.
**American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, 5(2), 99-134. - Kushnir, A. (2013). Harmful signaling in matching markets.
**Games and Economic Behavior**, 80, 209-218. - Kornbluth, D. and Kushnir, A. (2023). Undergraduate course allocation through competitive markets. Working paper.
- Kushnir, A., Tarasov, A. & Zubrickas, R. (2021). On equilibrium in monopolistic competition with endogenous labor,
**Economics Letters**, 201, 109774. - Kushnir, A. & Zurbrickas, R. (2023). Optimal labor income taxation with the dividend effect.
**R&R Economic Theory.** - Schweyer, A., Fan, A., Ford, E., Kang, J. & Kushnir, A. (2022) Decentralized Workforce: Fundamental Drivers and Engagement in the New Workplace, Incentives Research Foundation report.