Faculty

Professor and Director of the Center for Formal Epistemology

Baker Hall 135K

412.268.8567

kk3n@andrew.cmu.edu

Research Interests

I am mainly interested in how scientific method could possibly lead us to true generalizations about Nature; generalizations that extend infinitely beyond our current, finite perspective. Standard philosophy of science sidesteps this question by asking, instead, about the meanings of "justification" and "rationality" a different matter entirely. I put the former question front and center, so that methodological normativity must be traced back to truth-finding efficacy, rather than to sociological generalizations about scientific practice. In this respect, my approach to epistemology closely parallels work in theoretical computer science and the foundations of mathematics, in which the central question is existence of a reliable procedure for finding the right answer to a question. The shift in emphasis results in a fresh, new perspective on a number of standard issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science, such as:

Ockham's razor and realism (NSF project page)
How rationality can impede the search for truth
The logic of discovery
Goodman's new riddle of induction
Underdetermination and uncomputability
A defense of infinite epistemic regress
Belief revision
Relativism and convergent realism
Causal inference
Distinguishing chaos from non-chaos
Epistemic logic

I have side interests in the philosophy of religion and eastern philosophy.

Selected Publications

(with Conor Mayo-Wilson) "Ockham Efficiency Theorem for Random Empirical Methods", under review at Journal of Philosophical Logic.
"Simplicity, Truth, and Probability", in Handbook for the Philosophy of Statistics, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster eds., Dordrecht: Elsevier. 2010.
(with Conor Mayo-Wilson) "Review of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning theory" by Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, http://ndpr.nd.edu/board.cfm, 2008.
"Ockham’s Razor, Truth, and Information", in Handbook of the Philosophy of Information, J. van Behthem and P. Adriaans, Dordrecht: Elsevier 2008.
"Ockham’s Razor, Empirical Complexity, and Truth-finding Efficiency", Theoretical Computer Science, 383: 270-289, 2007.
"Simplicity, Truth, and the Unending Game of Science", in Infinite Games: Foundations of the Formal Sciences V. S. Bold, B. Loewe, T. Raesch, J. van Benthenm, eds. Roskilde: College Press 2007 pp. 223-270.
"How Simplicity Helps You Find the Truth Without Pointing at it",in Philosophy of Mathematics and Induction, V. Harazinov, M. Friend, and N. Goethe, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
"How to Do Things with an Infinite Regress",in Philosophy of Mathematics and Induction, V. Harazinov, M. Friend, and N. Goethe, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
"Justification as Truth-finding Efficiency: How Ockham's Razor Works", Minds and Machines 14: 2004, pp. 485-505.
"Uncomputability: The Problem of Induction Internalized," Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 317: 2004, 227-249.
"Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification", in Christopher Hitchcock, ed., Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, London: Blackwell, 2004.
"Learning Theory and Epistemology", in Handbook of Epistemology, I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Smolenski, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004.
"The Logic of Success", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, special millennium issue, 51, 2001, 639-666.
Reprinted in Philosophy of Science Today, P. Clark and K. Hawley eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
"Efficient Convergence Implies Ockham's Razor", Proceedings of the 2002 International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications, Las Vegas, USA, June 24-27, 2002.
"A Close Shave with Realism: Ockham's Razor Derived from Efficient Convergence", completed manuscript.
"Naturalism Logicized", in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Current Issues in Scientific Method, R. Nola and H. Sankey, eds, 34 Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, pp. 177-210.
"Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia," Erkenntnis, 50, 1998 pp. 11-58.
"The Learning Power of Iterated Belief Revision", in Proceedings of the Seventh TARK Conference Itzhak Gilboa, ed., 1998, pp. 111-125.
"Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia," Erkenntnis, 50, 1998 pp. 11-58.
(with O. Schulte and V. Hendricks) "Reliable Belief Revision", in Logic and Scientfic Methods, M. L. Dalla Chiara, et al., eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.
(with O. Schulte and C. Juhl) "Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science", Philosophy of Science 64: 1997, pp. 245-267.
(with O. Schulte) "Church's Thesis and Hume's Problem," in Logic and Scientific Methods, M. L. Dalla Chiara, et al., eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997, pp. 383-398.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
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(with O. Schulte) "The Computable Testability of Theories with Uncomputable Predictions", Erkenntnis 43: 29-66, 1995, 29-66. Reviewed in the Journal of Symbolic Logic.
(with H. Lin) "A Geological Solution to the Lottery Paradox", forthcoming, Synthese.