Kevin T.
KellyKevin T. Kelly
Professor and Director of the Center for Formal EpistemologyDepartment of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University
Baker Hall 135K
412 268 8567
kk3n(at)andrew.cmu.edu
Research Interests
I am interested mainly in the connection between scientific method and finding the truth. Whereas most philosophers see the uncertainty of inductive inference as an argument for skepticism that must be defeated, I am motivated by an insight commonplace in theoretical computer science---that a given procedure is justified by the demonstrable, negative fact that no other method could do better. In the context of the problem of induction, the fact that no possible method could find the truth with an a priori guarantee against fallibility that justifies reversals of opinion as experience increases. This alternative viewpoint has led to publications in a number of areas:- Formal learning theory
- Ockham's
razor and realism (NSF project page)
- The philosophy of induction
- The lottery paradox and the logic of acceptance
- Computationally bounded scientific rationality
- Analysis of epistemic regresses
- The learning power of belief revision
- Relativism and convergent realism
- Causal inference
- Philosophy of religion
- Eastern philosophy
Selected Publications
- (with Conor Mayo-Wilson) "Ockham
Efficiency Theorem for Random Empirical Methods", under review at
Journal of Philosophical Logic.
- "Simplicity, Truth, and Probability", in Handbook for the Philosophy of Statistics, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster eds., Dordrecht: Elsevier. 2010.
- (with Conor Mayo-Wilson) "Review of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning theory" by Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, http://ndpr.nd.edu/board.cfm, 2008.
- "Ockham’s Razor,
Truth, and Information", in Handbook of the Philosophy of
Information, J. van Behthem and P. Adriaans, Dordrecht: Elsevier 2008.
- "Ockham’s Razor, Empirical Complexity, and Truth-finding Efficiency", Theoretical Computer Science, 383: 270-289, 2007.
- "Simplicity, Truth, and the Unending Game of Science", in Infinite Games: Foundations of the Formal Sciences V. S. Bold, B. Loewe, T. Raesch, J. van Benthenm, eds. Roskilde: College Press 2007 pp. 223-270.
- "How Simplicity Helps You Find the Truth Without Pointing at it",in Philosophy of Mathematics and Induction, V. Harazinov, M. Friend, and N. Goethe, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
- "How to Do Things with an Infinite Regress",in Philosophy of Mathematics and Induction, V. Harazinov, M. Friend, and N. Goethe, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
- "Justification as Truth-finding Efficiency: How Ockham's Razor Works", Minds and Machines 14: 2004, pp. 485-505.
- "Uncomputability: The Problem of Induction Internalized," Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 317: 2004, 227-249.
- "Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification", in Christopher Hitchcock, ed., Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, London: Blackwell, 2004.
- "Learning Theory and Epistemology", in Handbook of Epistemology, I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Smolenski, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004.
- "The Logic of Success", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, special millennium issue, 51, 2001, 639-666.
- Reprinted in Philosophy of Science Today, P. Clark and K. Hawley eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- "Efficient Convergence Implies Ockham's Razor", Proceedings of the 2002 International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications, Las Vegas, USA, June 24-27, 2002.
- "A Close Shave with Realism: Ockham's Razor Derived from Efficient Convergence", completed manuscript.
- "Naturalism Logicized", in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Current Issues in Scientific Method, R. Nola and H. Sankey, eds, 34 Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, pp. 177-210.
- "Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia," Erkenntnis, 50, 1998 pp. 11-58.
- "The Learning Power of Iterated Belief Revision", in Proceedings of the Seventh TARK Conference Itzhak Gilboa, ed., 1998, pp. 111-125.
- "Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia," Erkenntnis, 50, 1998 pp. 11-58.
- (with O. Schulte and V. Hendricks) "Reliable Belief Revision", in Logic and Scientfic Methods, M. L. Dalla Chiara, et al., eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.
- (with O. Schulte and C. Juhl) "Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science", Philosophy of Science 64: 1997, pp. 245-267.
- (with O. Schulte) "Church's Thesis and Hume's Problem," in Logic and Scientific Methods, M. L. Dalla Chiara, et al., eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997, pp. 383-398.
- The
Logic of Reliable
Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
[HTML file containing analytical table of contents only] - (with O. Schulte) "The Computable Testability of Theories with Uncomputable Predictions", Erkenntnis 43: 29-66, 1995, 29-66. Reviewed in the Journal of Symbolic Logic.
- (with H. Lin) "A Geological Solution to the Lottery
Paradox", forthcoming, Synthese.
Courses
Undergraduate
- 80-105: Freshman Seminar on Mysticism
- 80-120: Reflections on Science
- 80-201: Epistemology
- 80-202: Metaphysics
- 80-210: Self-paced Introduction to Logic
- 80-220: Philosophy of Science
- 80-251: Ancient Philosophy
- 80-252: Medieval Philosophy
- 80-252: History of Modern Philosophy
- 80-265: Philosophy of Religion
- 80-310: Logic and Computability
- 80-311: Logic and Artificial Intelligence
- 80-311: Goedel and Undecidability
- 80-312: Probability and Artificial Intelligence
- 80-351: Kant
- 80-812: Seminar on Formal Learning Theory
- 80-411/711: Computability and Learnibility
- 80-411/711: Descriptive Set Theory
- 80-518: Epistemology Seminar
- 80-602: Proseminar
Fun
Mountain climbing
Scratch-built sailing models
Painting
Cooking
Travel